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COMMENTS
INTERNATIONAL: LAW-THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY
FORCE-LEGAL STATUS-The United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) was created in November 19561 to facilitate the withdrawal from Egypt of British, French and Israeli troops. 2 By
February 1957 UNEF had reached a strength of about 6,000 men
consisting of troop contingents furnished by UN member states
other than permanent members of the Security Council.3 Its
headquarters staff is drawn from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine,4 and some technical services
are provided by the Secretariat.5 The troop contingents are supplied from the armed forces of contributing states but carry only
light arms and are not capable of dealing with anything more
serious than individual or guerilla type actions.
The UNEF is the first force of its kind ever used by the United
Nations. Its objectives, organization and capabilities are altogether different from the UN forces that fought in Korea6 and
from those provided for in Article 43 of the UN Charter. 7 The
Force is strong enough to carry out its duties of patrolling a military truce or cease fire, but cannot and is not intended to resist
organized military aggression by any state. Secretary General
Hammarskjold· describes the force as "more than an observer's
corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the
territory in which it is stationed...." 8 Its presence and functionl Res. 1000 (ES-I) and Res. 1001 (ES-I) U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., First Emergency Special Session, Supp. No. 1 {A/3354) (1956).
2 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1[47 (1957). See Goodrich and Rosner, "The United Nations
Emergency Force," 11 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 413 (1957); FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS
PEACE FORCE (1957); PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 206
(1957).
3 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1[3 (1957). Units were contributed by Brazil, Canada, Colombia,
Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia, id., 1[4. Of these
6,000 only about 3,500 were available for patrol and guard duties, id., 1[6.
4 Res. 1000 (ES-I) U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., First Emergency Special Session,
Supp. No. 1 (A/3354) (1956).
5 U.N. Doc. A/3694, ffll (1957).
6 For a full discussion of the Korean episode, see Goodrich, "Korea-Collective Measures Against Aggression," INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, No. 494, Carnegie '.Endowment for
International Peace (Oct. 1953); Goodrich, "Efforts To '.Establish International Police
Force Down to 1950," Appx. to FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE 184-194 (1957).
7 See text following note 30 infra.
s U.N. Doc. A/3302, 1[12 (1956). "The Force, which has an international character as
a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, as affirmed in its regulations, was not established ,to undertake enforcement actions. While UNEF has a military organization, it does
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ing on Egyptian territory depend entirely on the consent of Egypt. 9
Although the Emergency Force was authorized on a strictly
temporary basis, the success which it has achieved in relieving an
international crisis and restoring, temporarily at least, order in
Gaza, Suez and the Sinai Peninsula10 has prompted support for
the establishment of such a force on a permanent basis. 11 Lebanon,
Jordan, Kashmir12 and the Tunisian-Algerian border13 have all
been the subje~ts of recent proposals for the stationing of a similar
UN force. Such a force could also be used by the Security Council,
for instance, in connection with Article 40 of the Charter under
which the Council can call upon the parties to a dispute to comply
with measures aimed at effecting a cease fire and which do not
result in prejudice to either party.14 This article would be substantially more effective if a neutral force could ensure that a
complying party will not suffer prejudice.
The present force has already furnished experience that can
be highly useful1 5 in creating a permanent or another ad hoc force;

not use all normal military methods in achieving the objectives defined for it by the
General Assembly..•• [T]he functions foreseen for UNEF when the cease-fire was being
established, were to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order 'to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian
troops.'" U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1[31 (1957).
U.N. Doc. A/3302, 1[9 (1956).
Doc. A/3694, 1[1[30 to 34, 44, 45 (1957); statement of Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on
H. Res. 367 and H. Con. Res. 373, .85th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 3-4 (1958).
11 See Pearson, "Force for U,N.," 35 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 395 (1957); FRYE, A UNITED
NATIONS PEACE FORCE 66 et seq. (1957); Munro, "The Case for a Standing U.N. Army,"
NEW YoRK TIMES MAGAZINE, p. 8, July 27, 1958; Report of Mr. Carnahan from the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Relative to the Establishment of a United Nations Force,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the
Committee for Foreign Affairs on H. Res. 367 and H. Con. Res. 373, 85th Cong., 2d
sess., p. 97 et seq. (1958); President Eisenhower's speech before the U.N. General Assembly
on Aug. 13, 1958, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1958, p. 6:2; Secretary of State Dulles's speech
before the Assembly on Sept. 18, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1958, p. 4:2.
12 United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/3821 (1957). India has vehemently
rejected the idea and warned that it would consider an offer to participate in such a
force as "an unfriendly act.'' 3 U.N. CHRONICLE, col. 1003 (1957).
13 The United States has favored the use of UN observers in that area. N .Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1958, §1, p. 12:3-4, but the proposal encountered considerable difficulty, 51
NEWSWEEK, April 14, 1958, p. 42:3.
14 See GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 273-276 (1949); GoonRICH AND SIMONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY 381 (1955). The Security Council could also invoke article 39 for this purpose
on the theory that the force is a measure not involving the use of armed force (see article
41) which is to be employed to give effect to a decision of the Council.
15 The Secretary General designated a special committee of the Secretariat headed
9

10 U.N.
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and this is especially true of its legal aspects. The purpose of this
comment is to consider the legal status of UNEF and of a potential
permanent force of the same type. Some of the incidental legal
problems confronting the United Nations will also be considered.

I. Basis in the Charter
A detailed analysis of the constitutional basis of UNEF has
already been the subject of able treatment16 and is beyond the
scope of this comment. Some brief observations on this subject
will nevertheless be useful in exploring the legal status of the force.
UNEF is described, in terms of UN constitutional doctrine, as
a subsidiary-6rgan of the General Assembly, 17 functioning in accordance with the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. 18 "Uniting for
Peace" was the response of the General Assembly to the Security
Council's failure to carry out its "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security"19 in connection
with the Korean episode. 20 The resolution is a statement of policy
that the Assembly shall consider on an emergency basis any threat
to or breach of the peace or act of aggression and make recommendations concerning it whenever lack of unanimity prevents
the Security Council from exercising its primary responsibility. 21
The resolution thus explains the General Assembly's assumption
of responsibility in the Suez crisis, but does not provide for the
establishment of a UN force.
The authority for organizing such a force is said to be found
in Article 22 of the Charter which authorizes the Assembly to_
"establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for' the
by Dr. Ralph Bunche -to make·
CHRONICLE, col. 990 (1957).

a comprehensive analysis of all

aspects of UNEF. 3 U.N.

16 See Sohn, "The Authority of the United Nations To Establish and Maintain a
Permanent United Nations Force," 52 AM. J. INT. L. 229 (1958); Goodrich and Rosner,
"TJie United Nations Emergency Force," 11 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 413 (1957).
11 U.N. Doc. A/3694, p. 12 (1957).
18 Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the period Sept. 19 to Dec.
15, 1950, U.N. GENERAL AssE!IIBLY OFF. REc., 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1175,
p. IO; U.N. Doc. A/3302, p. 4 (1956).
19 U.N. CHARTER, art. 24.
20 See note 6 supra.
21 Concerning this resolution, see generally: 1 REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRAC·
TICE 306, 307 (1955); Johnson, "The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the
United Nations," 32 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 97 at 156, 157 (1955-1956); GOODRICH AND SIMONS,
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 408414 (1955); CHEEVER AND HAVILAND, ORGANIZING FOR PEACE 486-489 (1954); STONE, L!lGAL
CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 266-278 (1954).
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performance of its functions." This article is clearly limited by
the scope of the Assembly's functions as they are defined elsewhere
in the Charter.22 The provisions of the Charter and its drafting
history indicate two limitations on the Assembly's authority to
establish a UN force. The first is that the Assembly's functions
are all stated in terms of discussion and recommendation, which
reflects a distinction the drafters of the Charter sought to draw
between the General Assembly, as a kind of "to-wn meeting of the
world," 23 in contrast to the Security Council which was to exercise
sole responsibility for taking action on behalf of the organization.24
The second limitation is the incapacity of the Assembly (not
shared by the Security Council) to impose a legally binding obligation upon the members in matters concerning the preservation of
international peace.25
The distinction between the Assembly as the organ of discussion and the Council as the body responsible for action has not
been carefully respected, however. The practice of the General
Assembly contains several instances of what may be described as
direct action on the part of the Assembly, e.g., its resolutions of
February I [498(V)] 26 and May 18, 1951 [500(V)] 27 declaring
Communist China an aggressor in Korea and urging an embargo
against her, and the establishment of the Korean Reconstruction
Agency in 1950.28 It is therefore generally accepted that the Assembly had power to establish UNEF as a subsidiary organ of the
General Assembly.29
22 See GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 183-194 (1949), where
it is stated at 193-194 with regard to subsidiary organs of the General Assembly: "Th·e
basic rule for all such ,bodies is that their authority cannot exceed that of the General
Assembly from which it is derived." But cf. Goodrich and Rosner, "The United Nations
Emergency Force," 11 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 413 at 417-419 (1957).
23 Kll.sEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 199-200 (1950).
24 GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 28, 150, 172-174 (1949).
25 GOODRICH AND SIMONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 428 (1955); Johnson, "The Effect of Resolutions of the General
Assembly of the United Nations," 32 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 97 (1955-1956).
26 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 224-225 (1951).
27 Id. at 228.
28 The Agent General of the Agency was directed "to carry out the recommendations
of the General Assembly••• .'' Res. 410 (V) A &: B, U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc.,
5th Sess., Supp. No. 20 (Doc. A/1775) pp. 31-35 (1950). Another such instance is the Commission of Palestine established in 1947, Kll.sEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 195-196
(1950).
29 Goodrich and Rosner, "The United Nations Emergency Force," 11 INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 413 (1957). Although UNEF is regarded in its entirety as a subsidiary organ
of the General Assembly, it would also be possible for the Assembly to establish only a
Command, and then recommend to the member states that they furnish troop contingents
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The Soviet Union, which did not oppose the establishment of
UNEF, purportedly because it was accepted by Egypt, has challenged its constitutionality on the ground that it is an illegal
substitute for the forces prescribed in Article 43 of the Charter,30
the only article expressly providing for UN forces. In that article
all members of the United Nations undertake to make armed
forces available to the Security Council on its call for the purpose
of maintaining international peace and security. These forces were
to be made available on the basis of special agreements between
member states and the Security Council, but no such agreements
have been concluded, and hence, no forces made available under
Article 43 because the permanent members of the Security Council
reached an early impasse over the principles which should govern
the composition of any such forces. 31 The Russian argument is
unacceptable because of the basically different functions for which
UNEF and Article 43 forces were designed. The latter were intended to provide the Security Council with fighting forces capable
of stopping any organized military aggression, whereas UNEF is
not intended to impose the will of the United Nations on any nation, but to assist both parties to a dispute in effectuating and
preserving a cease fire.
It is clear that even under a broad construction of its powers
the General Assembly cannot obligate a member to accept a UN
force on its territory, and the scope of its operations as well as the
duration of its stay depend on the consent of the host state. Nor
can the General Assembly obligate any member state to make
available its troops for service with the force. However, it is a very
different thing to say that the decision to establish the Force
which would act in accordance with the recommendations of the UN Command. The
difference is that under the latter plan, the troops would be acting as national units and
their status would ,be determined solely by reference to the status of friendly foreign
forces under international law (discussed infra). If, on the other hand, the troop contingents constitute part of a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, they are entitled
to the privileges and immunities of the United Nations under Article 105 of the Charter
(discussed infra).
ao Report of the Fifth Committee, U.N. GENERAL ASSEJ11BLY OFF. REc., 11th Sess.
Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66, p. 65, 1[25 (Doc. A/3560) (1957).
31 Russia insisted that the contributions of all members be quantitatively and qualitatively equal. This would mean that no contribution could be stronger than that of the
weakest member, and in view of the weakened condition of postwar Nationalist China,
for example, the result would have been to limit the forces to token size. See Goodrich,
"Efforts To Establish International Police Force Down to 1950," appx. to FRYE, A UNITED
NATIONS PEACE FORCE 175-184 (1957); and 2 REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 23-54
(1955).
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(assuming this to be otherwise valid under the Charter) and to
recommend that members contribute military contingents is in
any way dependent on the consent of the host state. Nevertheless,
the Secretary General did not dispute the Indian position (expressed as a condition of its contribution to UNEF): "It is understood that the Force may have to function through Egyptian territory. Therefore, there must be Egyptian consent for its establishment."32 This qualification may seem unimportant since, in any
event, a force cannot function without the consent of the host
state. As a practical matter, however, the prior existence of a force
could prove an important factor in obtaining this consent.33 No
such limitation on the General Assembly's authority appears in
the Charter either expressly or by reasonable inference.
There are alternative methods of establishing a UN force.
There is no legal obstacle to the establishment of a force by the
Security Council34 if it should so desire. Another possibility is the
establishment of a force as part of the Secretariat.35 The justification for this may be found in Article 97 of the Charter which provides that the Secretariat "shall comprise ... such staff as the organization may require." This was the basis upon which the Secretary
General established the United Nations Field Service, with the
approval of the General Assembly, in 1949.36 The Field Service was
established for the purpose of providing physical protection as well
as technical services and facilities for UN missions37 and is now
handling communications for UNEF.38 A Field Reserve Panel,
which is nothing more than a list of qualified senior military personnel who can be called to service for supervision and observation
work when needed,39 was established in conjunction with the Field
Service but has not been utilized. These two agencies resulted from

32 U.N. Doc. A/3302/Add. 4fRev. I, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REc., First Emergency
Special Sess. 23, 24 (1956).
33 This consideration undoubtedly motivated the Indian stipulation. See note 12
supra, and FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE 7 (1957).
34 Sohn, "The Authority of the United Nations To Establish and Maintain a Permanent United Nations Force," 52 AM. J. INT. L. 229 (1958).
35 Id. at 235.
36 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 425 (1948-1949).
37 U.N. GENERAL AssE?.IBLY OFF. ,REc., 4th Sess., Supp. No. I, Doc. A/930, pp. xiv
to xv (1949); note 36 supra.
38 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1fll (1957).
39 U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 4th Sess., Supp. No. 13, Doc. A/959, p. 2 (1949);
Schwebel, "A United Nations 'Guard' and a United Nations 'Legion,'" appx. to FRYE,
A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE 202, 203 (1957).

62

MICHIGAN

LA.w

REVIEW

[ Vol. 57

Trygvie Lie's proposal in 1948 for a UN Guard Force40 that would
have performed essentially the same kind of functions as UNEF41
• in addition to furnishing security for UN missions. If a permanent
UN force is to be established in the near future there is something
to be said in favor of doing so within the framework of the Secretariat.42 Perhaps the most important consideration is that the cost
of maintaining a standing force larger than current needs require
would be prohibitive43 and since the present need is primarily for
advance planning of administrative and legal arrangements,44 any
successful proposal for a permanent force is likely to result in no
more than institution of the needed administrative machinery.45
The Field Service and Reserve Panel, which serve closely related
functions, are a part of the Secretariat, and efficient administration
would favor consolidation of these agencies. Moreover, as part of
the Secretariat, the Force could more easily recruit its personnel
directly and there would be no question that every member thereof
is an agent of the United Nations rather than his national state.46
Of course there may be considerable political difficulties in obtaining an agreement in the UN on such direct recruitment.

II. Legal Status
The status of UNEF concerns its relation to the sovereign of
. the territory in which it is functioning. We have already observed
that the presence and functioning of UNEF in Egypt are premised
on that government's consent, from which it follows that the Force
would be obligated to remove itself from Egyptian territory if that
government should so demand. 47 The following discussion is addressed to the status of the Force while it is present and functioning
pursuant to the consent of the host state.
40 Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, U.N.
GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 3d s~ .. Supp. No. 1, Doc. A/565, pp. xvii to xviii (1948);
for the text of the proposal see U.N. Doc. A/656 (1948).
·
41 See FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE 32-45 (1957).
42 This is envisaged by Secretary of State Dulles's proposal, N .Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1958, p. 4:2.
43 Goodrich and Rosner, "The United Nations Emergency Force," 11 INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 413 at 429 (1957); FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE 72, 73 (1957).
44 FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FoRCE 81 et seq. (1957); Pearson, "Force for U.N.,"
35 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 395, 401, 402 (1957).
45 See speech by Sir Leslie Munro, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1957, §1, p. 19:2, (Late City
Edition).
46 See note 29 supra.
47 Note 9 supra.
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In considering the status of UNEF, it is important to keep in
mind its two most important characteristics: (a) it is a subsidiary
organ of the General Assembly, and thus an agency of the
United Nations; and (b) it is military in nature, its personnel
consisting almost entirely of units of the regular armed forces of
UN member states. The relations between UNEF and Egypt are
regulated by a specific agreement concluded between the Secretary
General and the Egyptian Foreign Minister,48 and approved by
the General Assembly. 49 Before examining the provisions of this
agreement, it will be useful to consider the factors that would
govern the status of the Force in the absence of a specific agreement. This was in effect the circumstance in which UNEF functioned during the first two months of its operation prior to the
conclusion of the agreement.50
A. Factors Influencing the Status of the Force. Rules and practices relevant to this question may be derived from three sources.
(I) The first is found in Articles 104 and 10551 of the UN Charter
and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, 52 proffered by the General Assembly thereunder,
in other Charter provisions and in the rules that have developed
in the application thereof. (2) A second source may be found in the
customary rules of international law concerning state responsibility
as applied to international organizations (particularly the UN), and
in the. practices that have been developed in connection with UN
observer and truce supervision groups such as those which have
functioned on various occasions in Palestine, Greece and Pakistan.
(3) Also of considerable importance is customary international law
48 Report of the Secretary General on arrangements concerning the status of the
United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, U,N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 11th Sess.,
Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66, p. 52 (Doc. A/3526) (1957), hereinafter cited as UNEF
Agreement.
40 Res. 1126 (XI), U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 11th Sess., Annexes, Agenda
Item 66 at 76 (Doc. AjRes/485) (1957). The agreement is summarized and discussed
briefly by Goodrich and Rosner, "The United Nations Emergency Force," II INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 413 at 425, 426 (1957).
50 From the time UNEF first entered Egypt in November 1956 until the status agreement was concluded on February 8, 1957, the only specific agreement concerning its
status was an aide-memoire between the Secretary General and the Egyptian Government
which called for a more detailed agreement and required all parties to act in good faith
until it could be concluded. U.N. Doc. A/3375, p. 9, IO (1956), approved by the General
Assembly in Res. 1121 (XI), U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REc., 11th Sess., Annexes,
Agenda Item 66, p. 75 (Doc. AfRes/411) (1956-1957).
51 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL I.AW 206 at 222 (1957).
52 Resolutions Adopted During the First Part of its First Session, U.N. GENERAL
AssEMBLY OFF. REc. 25 to 27, Doc. A/64 (1946); 43 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. I (1949).
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as well as the provisions of recent multilateral treaties, bearing
upon the status of friendly military forces while stationed on
foreign soil.
Privileges, Immunities and Rights of the United Nations. Article 105 of the UN Charter provides: "(l) The Organization shall
enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes," and
"(2) ... officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent
exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization."
This article rejects the notion, contended for by some governments,
that an international organization is entitled to the privileges,
exemptions and immunities accorded foreign governments under
customary international law, and that officials of such organizations
should enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.53 The principle adopted by Article 105, which has been cited as declaratory
of customary international law, 54 is that the privileges of the organization and its officials should be limited to what is necessary for
the carrying out of their functions.
This general principle leaves unanswered all of the difficult
questions that arise in its practical application. It was for . this
reason that Article 105 specifically empowered the General Assembly to make recommendations or propose conventions "with a
view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1
and 2 of [Article 105]." In accordance with this provision, in 1946
the General Assembly proposed the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, which has been accepted by
some (including Egypt) 55 but not all (e.g., the United States) 56 of
the members.
This Convention grants "the United Nations, its property and
assets wherever located and by whomsoever held" immunity "from
every form of legal process" except where expressly waived, and no

53 See Preuss, "The International Organizations Immunities Act," 40 AM. J. INT. L.
332 (1946).
54 Ibid.
55 U.N. Doc. A/64, 25-34 (1946).
56 Congress enacted the International Organizations Immunities Act, 59 Stat. 669
(1945), 22 U.S.C. (1952) §288, which serves the same purpose but is less favorable to the
UN ,than the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. See Preuss, "The International
Organizations Immunities Act," 40 AM. J. INT. L. 332 (1946). The United States also
concluded a Headquarters Agreement with the United Nations, 61 Stat. 3416, in force
Nov. 21, 1947, 61 Stat. 756. See also 71 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1300 (1958).
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waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution."
The premises and archives of the United Nations are declared
inviolable. Its assets, income and other property are exempt from
direct taxes and customs duties and regulations. The privileges
accorded its communications and correspondence may be generally
described as those accorded diplomatic communications. 57 UN
personnel are accorded varying privileges in accordance with their
rank and duties. Several of these provisions have been incorporated
into the UNEF status agreement and will be noted in that
connection.
Under international law a state has the duty to observe a certain
minimum standard in its treatment of foreign nationals on its soil.
Private persons have no standing to complain of a breach of such
duty and are dependent on their national states to press an international claim for them. Although Article 104 grants the United
Nations Organization legal capacity in the sense that it can make
contracts and bring suit in national courts, the Charter does not
specifically confer international personality 58 on the organization,
which it must have if it is to press an international claim. The
International Court of Justice filled this gap by inferring from the
Charter as a whole that the organization has sufficient international
personality for this purpose, 59 so that the UN may protect the
rights of its agents just as a state safeguards the interests of its
citizens.
The status accorded to UN observer and truce supervision
groups is clearly pertinent in determining the status of an international force. A host state's duty to furnish personal protection
for officials of such groups is illustrative. The government which
is in control of territory in which UN officials carry out their
functions, and which furnishes them personal protection, may be
held responsible for their safety. These were the principal grounds
on which Israel was held responsible in damages for the assassination on Israeli-controlled territory60 of UN truce mediator Count
Bernadotte.61
522 (1949).
'international personality'
of the Organization. . . . Practice will bring about the evolution of appropriate rules so
far as necessary." Dept. of State, Conference Series 71, pp. 157, 158 (1945).
59 "Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations," Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174.
60 43 AM. J. !NT. L. 95 (1949).
61 Count Bernadotte was in charge of "a multinational uniformed police group •••
57 GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
58 "This Article [104] does not deal with what is called the
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Status of Friendly Foreign Forces Under International Law.62
In view of the predominantly military character of UNEF's personnel, the status of friendly foreign armed forces in international
law is especially relevant. This matter has been of increasing
importance since World War I and is currently posed by the large
numbers of such troops in Europe under the NATO and Warsaw
Pacts and in Japan. There is support for the proposition that under
customary international law, when a sovereign consents to the passage or sojourn of a foreign force, it impliedly concedes that force
such freedom from local restraints and controls as is needed to
carry out the purposes for which the presence of such forces is
intended. 63 This standard is too general to be of much practical
value and in most instances where there have been sufficient forces
to make the question important, a specific agreement has either
been concluded64 or sought in negotiations. 65 Although some of the
major powers have been able to secure exclusive jurisdiction over
their forces in wartime, 66 the most important treaties since World
War II, viz., those regulating the status of NATO and Warsaw
Pact forces, have tended to emphasize concurrent jurisdiction,67

consisting initially of about 50 UN guards . . . as aides to the military observers of the
truce ordered by the Security Council." "The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF),"
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE 6 (1957).
62 See generally: 32 N.Y. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 351 (1957); 70 HARV. L. REv. 1043 (1957);
Schwartz, "International Law and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement," 53 CoL. L.
REv. 1091 (1953); Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction,"
27 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 186 (1950); Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity from
Supervisory Jurisdiction," 26 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 380 (1949); King, "Further Developments
Concerning Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Forces," 40 AM. J. INT. L. 257 (1946);
Brinton, "Jurisdiction Over Members of Allied Forces in Egypt," 38 AM. J. INT. L. 375
(1944); King, "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," 36 AM. J. INT. L. 539
(1942); 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §169, p. 393 (1941).
63 Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Supervisory Jurisdiction," 26
BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 380 at 411-413 (1949); King, "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign
Armed Forces," 36 AM. J. INT. L. 539 at 548 (1942); 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 393 (1949).
64 For collection and discussion of such treaties, see Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces:
Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction," 27 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 186 at 187-207 (1950);
Schwartz, "International Law and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement," 53 CoL. L.
REv. 1091 at 1094-1102 (1953).
65 In World War I the United States and Britain were negotiating for an agreement
when the Armistice intervened, King, "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces,"
36 AM. J. INT. L. 539 at 552, 553 (1942).
66 Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction,'' 27 BRIT.
Y. B. INT. L. 186 at 199-205 (1950). The United States had agreements conferring immunity
on U.S. forces in World War II with Belgium (respecting the Belgian Congo), Canada,
China, Egypt, India, and New Zealand. Id. at 200.
67 70 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1043 at 1049 (1957).
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with a formula of primary rights to its exercise, depending on the
relative interests of the sending and receiving states.68
The foregoing precedents furnish the principles from which
UNEF's status would have to be inferred in the absence of a
specific agreement, and from which the provisions of the agreement
presently governing the Force have been derived.
B. The UNEF Status Agreement. The Status Agreement is
premised on the conception that the entire Emergency Force is an
organ of the United Nations. Par?graph 23 states that "the United
Nations Emergency Force, as a subsidiary organ of the United
Nations established by the General Assembly, enjoys the status,
privileges and immunities of the United Nations." Evidence
that the contributing states are not acting in their national capacities under recommendations of the General Assembly, but are to
be treated as a constituent part of a subsidiary organ is found in the
provision which extends the immunities of the United Nations
under the Convention on Privileges and Immunities to "the property, funds and assets of Participating States used in Egypt in
connection with the national contingents serving in the United
Nations Emergency Force." 69
In addition to the status agreement, UNEF is governed by a
set of regulations issued by the Secretary General.7° Regulation 15
provides that the Secretary General "shall have authority for all
administrative, executive and financial matters affecting the Force
and shall be responsible for the negotiation and conclusion of
agreements with Governments concerning the Force." The Commander, who is appointed by the General Assembly,71 is given
"full command authority over the Force" and "is operationally
responsible for the performance of all functions assigned to the
Force by the United Nations." 72 Regulation 12 provides that "instructions from principal organs of the United Nations shall be
channeled by the Secretary General through the Commander and
the Chain of Command designated by him." 73

68 NATO SOF, art. VII, U3; Schwartz, "International Law and the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement," 53 CoL. L. REv. 1091 at 1092, n. 4 (1953).
60 UNEF Agreement, U23 (note 48 supra).
70 Regulations for the United Nations Emergency Force, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/UNEF/
1(1957), hereinafter cited: UNEF Regulation. These were issued after consultation with
the UNEF Advisory Committee.
71 Note 4 supra.
72 UNEF Regulation 11.
73 In designating ·the chain of command, the Commander is to make use of "the
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(1) Powers and privileges. It has already been noted that the
Force is "in no way a military force temporarily controlling the
territory in which it is stationed." 74 Nevertheless, it is essential to
the successful functioning of the Force that it exercise some control over the buffer zone in which it operates. Thus, the Force is
permitted to carry small arms, and has limited authority over individuals. The Secretary General reports that "UNEF is authorized
to apprehend infiltrators [along the Israeli-Egyptian armistice line]
and ... accepted practice is for UNEF to take infiltrators into custody in a zone extending 500 metres from the Demarcation Line,
and hand them over to the local police." 75 However, UNEF has not
yet been able to obtain authority "to fire during darkness at infiltrators approaching the line from either direction, which would be
somewhat broader than its unquestioned right to fire in self
defense-a right which it has, on occasion, exercised.... " 76
The Force is given rights to and definite powers over its encampments. Egypt is bound to provide the Force with necessary
premises, which, "without prejudice to the fact that all such premises remain Egyptian territory" are inviolable and subject to the
exclusive authority of the Commander. 77 The qualification regarding Egyptian territory, which is a paraphrase of a similar provision
in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1936,78 serves a political purpose but is legally redundant. The obligations of Egypt respecting
the premises of the Force are somewhat broader than the NATO
agreement under which the authorities of the receiving state
assume "sole responsibility for making suitable arrangements to
make available to a force or a civilian component the buildings
and grounds which it requires, as well as facilities and services
connected therewith;" 79 but does not declare premises of the

officers of the United Nations Command and the Commanders of the national contingents
made available by Participating Governments." UNEF Regulation 12.
Note 8 supra.
U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1f38.
Id., 1f44.
UNEF Agreement, 1f19.
Art. 5, U.K.T.S. 1937 No. 6, p. 24. The new (1957) Russian agreements with
Poland, 52 AM. J. INT. L. 211; East Germany, 52 AM. J. INT. L. 210, and Hungary, 52
AM. J. INT. L. 215, state in the first article that the "temporary presence" of Soviet troops
is without prejudice to the sovereignty of the receiving state and that they will not interfere in the internal affairs of that state.
79 NATO SOF, art. IX, 1f3. Paragraph 34 of the UNEF Agreement entitles the force
to the use of public utilities at rates not less favorable than those to comparable consumers. In case of interruption of service, the Force will receive the same priority as
74
75
76
77
78
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forces inviolable. Military police of the Force are authorized to
take into custody any person on the premises of the Force for
the purpose of turning him over immediately to the nearest appropriate Egyptian authorities "(a) when so requested by the
Egyptian authorities; or (b) for the purpose of dealing with any
offence or disturbance on the premises." 80
In .addition to these powers, UNEF enjoys a number of
privileges designed to enhance its effectiveness in carrying out
its mission. Members of UNEF, like NATO forces, 81 are exempt
from passport, visa and immigration restrictions on entering or
departing from the receiving state, being required to show only
personal identification and individual or collective movement
orders. 82
UNEF is assured "freedom of movement between Force headquarters, camps and other premises, within the area of operations,8~
and to and from points of access to Egyptian territory agreed upon
or to be agreed upon by the Egyptian Government and the
Commander." 84
The Egyptian authorities are to supply the force with information which may be useful in facilitating its movements; and "the
Government of Egypt recognizes the right of the Force and its
essential government services. The Force has the right to generate electricity on its
premises and to transmit and distribute it as needed.
so UNEF Agreement, 1fl5; NATO SOF, art. VII, 1f5 obligates the authorities of the
sending and receiving states to assist each other in arresting members of the force or its
civilian component but is not specific with regard to arrest of local citizens on the
premises of the forces. Art. VII, 1flO(a) authorizes the force to police its camps, although
all of 1fl0 appears to be directed toward control of members of the force.
81 NATO SOF, art. III.
82 UNEF Agreement, 1f7.
83" 'Area of operations' includes areas where the Force is deployed in the per•
formance of its functions as defined in paragraph 12 of the second and final report of
the Secretary General to the General Assembly . . . [see note 85 infra] military installations or other premises . . . [which are "such areas for headquarters, camps, or other
premises as may be necessary for the accommodation and fulfillment of the functions of
the Force," UNEF Agreement, 1f19] •.. and· lines of communication and supply utilized
pursuant to paragraphs 32 and 33. . . ." UNEF Agreement, 1f5.
84 UNEF Agreement, 1f32. Paragraph 33 gives the Force "the right to the use of roads,
bridges, canals and other waters, port facilities and airfields without the payment of
dues, tolls or charges by way of registration or otherwise in the area of operations and
the normal points of access, except for charges that are related directly to services rendered." This matter is not specifically dealt with in the NATO agreement. Article IV
thereof requires the receiving state to accept a driving license or permit of the sending
state or issue one of its own without requiring a driving test or fee. The UNEF agreement
does not mention driving licenses or permits specifically. Members of the Force are to
receive "the most favorable consideration" to requests for traveling facilities on railways
and fare concessions. Art. IX, 1f6 of NATO SOF is to the same effect.
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members to freedom of movement across armistice demarcation
lines in the performance of the functions 85 of the Force." 86 This
latter proviso points up one of the problems that has confronted
UNEF. Israel has not consented to the admission of the Force on
her side of the Is~aeli-Egyptian Armistice line of 1949 which
UNEF is now policing. Since the'status agreement is between only
the United Nations and Egypt, the Force still lacks the consent
of lsrael87 which is necessary before it can be stationed on that
nation's side of the line.
UNEF is granted diplomatic privileges for its communications, 88 which is a clear illustration of the impact of the international character of the Force on its status. No such extensive
privilege is found in other status of forces agreements.
The agreement confers a number of economic privileges on
the Force. It may obtain equipment, services and supplies from
local sources, and upon request of the Commander, Egyptian
authorities ar!=! to assist the Force in so doing. 89 Sympathetic consideration is to be given by the Commander to requests and observations of the Egyptian authorities so as to avoid any adverse
effect on the local economy. Members of the Force may purchase
goods for their own use "under conditions not less favorable than
for Egyptian citizens." 90
85 See note 5 supra. The functions of the Force as defined by the Secretary General
[U.N. Doc. A/3302, 1fl2 (1956)] and incorporated in 1f5 of the status agreement, note
48 supra, are: " .•. when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with
the consent of the Egyptian Government in order to maintain quiet during and after
the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the resolution of
2 November 1956 ..." and sustained by the General Assembly in resolution 1000 (ES-I)
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REC., First Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. I, Doc. A/3354
(1956). This original purpose of the Force has long since been accomplished and it has
taken up the additional function of policing the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement,
"The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)," INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE 1,2
(1957); U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1fl[30 to 34 (1957).
86 UNEF Agreement, 1f32, p. 56.
87 Israel has not consented to the operation of UNEF on its soil, U.N. Doc. A/3694,
1f15 (1957).
88 UNEF Agreement, 1f\[29 to 31. Article III of the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities assures the Organization no less favorable treatment for communications than
that accorded to any other government by the host state, including diplomatc missions.
There can be no censorship, and couriers get diplomatic privileges and immunities.
43 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. I at 3 (1949),
89 UNEF Agreement, 1f1f36, 37, p. 56; art. IX, 1f4 of NATO SOF gives the local
authorities greater control over the employment of local personnel.
ll0 UNEF Agreement, 1f37, p. 56. Comparable provisions appear in art. IX, 1f1fl and 2
of NATO SOF but are slightly more restrictive, reflecting the more significant purchases
by civilian components of those forces. UNEF Regulation 41 prohibits accompaniment by
families except where expressly authorized by the Commander.
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The terms of the UNEF agreement give the Force more latitude in the employment of local personnel than the NATO Status
of Forces Agreement. UNEF may recruit local personnel, giving
sympathetic consideration to avoiding any adverse effect on the
local economy and, although to the extent practicable the terms
and conditions of employment are to follow the practice prevailing
in the community, these may be prescribed by the Commander.91
The NATO agreement provides that conditions of employment,
including "wages, supplementary payments and conditions for the
protection of workers, shall be those laid down by the legislation
of the receiving state." 92 The most remarkable provision in the
UNEF agreement is that "disputes concerning the terms of employment and conditions of service of locally recruited personnel
shall be settled by administrative procedure to be established by
the Commander," 93 and this provision, in view of its affirmative
language, appears to be exclusive.94
(2) Immunities. The UNEF agreement contains an article common to other status agreements95 which states that the Force and
UN officials serving with it shall respect the laws and regulations
of Egypt and refrain from any activity of a political character.
In recognition of the unusual role of the Force, its members and
United Nations officials serving with it must refrain "from any
action incompatible with the international nature of their
duties ...." 96 The purpose of the immunities granted the Force
and its members is expressed in paragraph IO of the agreement as
"having regard to the special functions of the Force and to the
interests of the United Nations, and not for the personal benefit
of the members of the Force."
(a) Criminal jurisdiction. The Commander is required to take
all appropriate measures to ensure observance of the foregoing
obligations97 and to maintain discipline and good order among
members of the Force.98 With respect to criminal jurisdiction, the

91 UNEF Agreement, fl37 and UNEF Regulation 19(c).
92NATO SOF, art. IX, fl4.
93 UNEF Agreement fl38(c), p. 56. Article 38 provides that "Disputes or claims of
a private law character shall be settled in accordance with . . . [its] • . . provisions."
94 If disputes should arise between Egypt and the United Nations in this connection,
the arbitration procedures of fl40 (discussed infra) would be available.
95 E.g., NATO SOF, art. II; Poland, 52 AM. J. INT. L. 211, art. 3.
96 UNEF Agreement, fl6, p. 53.
97Ibid.
98 UNEF Agreement, fll4.
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agreement provides: "Members of the Force shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national States in respect
of any criminal offenses which may be committed by them in
Egypt. "99 .
This provision is particularly favorable to UNEF. Absolute
immunity has been the exception rather than the rule both in
customary international law and by treaty. 100 The UNEF agreement does not even contain a provision calling for friendly or
favorable consideration of a request for waiver of the sending
state's exclusive jurisdiction.101 Good reason for this favorable
treatment may be found, first, in the fact that UNEF, as its name
implies, entered Egypt to perform emergency services, more analogous to wartime conditions than those under which the NATO
and Warsaw Pact Forces are stationed. Secondly, there is a greater
emphasis on the temporary character of UNEF's stay than in most
other status situations. A third and significant factor is UNEF's
character as an organ of the UN, representing worldwide, rather
than merely national or regional interests.
It is common for status agreements to contain some provision
for arrest by either state and surrender of custody to whichever
state will exercise jurisdiction and to require prompt notice by the
arresting state.102 · The UNEF agreement defines the receiving
state's authority a little more closely than the NATO agreement.103
Egyptian authorities may take a member of the Force into custody
and deliver him to the nearest appropriate authorities of the Force
if the Commander so requests or "the military police of the Force
are unable to act with the necessary promptness when a member

99 Id., 1[11, p. 53.
100 See notes 63 and
101 The NATO SOF

67 supra.
contains no such provision where either party has exclusive
jurisdiction, but does so stipulate where jurisdiction is concurrent [art. VII, 1[3(c)]. The
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations makes the Secretary
General responsible for waiving the immunity of any official where, "in his opinion the
immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to
the interests of the United Nations." 43 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. I at 5 (1949), art. V, §20.
Article V is made applicable to members of the Secretariat attached to UNEF and these
people appear to be the only persons connected with the Force to which a specific waiver
provision is applicable, in this case by incorporation. No reason_ appears for isolating
members of· the Secretariat for special treatment in this regard and the arrangements
ought to be more clear on this point.
102 See NATO SOF, art. VII, 1[5.
103 NATO SOF, art. VII, 1[9(a): "The authorities of the receiving and sending States
shall assist each other in the arrest of -members of a force or civilian component . . •
and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction. . . ."
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... is apprehended in the commission or attempted commission
of a criminal offense that results or might result in serious injury
to persons or property, or serious impairment of other legally
protected rights." 104 He may be subjected to a preliminary interrogation by the Egyptian authorities, but the transfer of custody
to the Force may not be delayed. Following transfer of custody,
the person concerned is to be made available for further interrogation by the arresting authority.105
(b) Civil jurisdiction. The comparative treatment of the several
types of UNEF personnel with regard to immunity from civil
jurisdiction is perhaps the best illustration of the hybrid nature
of the Force. The Commander and his family are entitled to
privileges, immunities and facilities under the Convention on
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which include,
inter alia, "the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law." 100 Officers of the Command (the Commander's Headquarters staff) enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded by
the Convention to experts on missions for the United Nations,
which are those "necessary for the independent exercise of their
functions." 107 Members of the Secretariat attached to the Force
and their families retain their privileges as "officials of the United
Nations" under Articles V and VII108 of the Convention on
Privileges and Immunities, with the exception of local personnel,
whose immunity is limited to their official acts. 109
In addition to these special cases, it is generally provided that
members of the Force are not subject to the civil jurisdiction of
the Egyptian courts in any matter relating to their official duties110
and the factual determination as to whether a matter relates to
the official duties of a member is to be made by the UNEF Com-

104 UNEF Agreement, 1[16, p. 54.
105 Id., 1[17, p. 54.
100 Id., 1[25, p. 55.
1071bid.
108 Article V of the Convention grants various immunities, including immunity for
words uttered or acts done in an official capacity, exemption for pay, freedom from
national service obligations and extends immigration benefits to dependent relatives.
Article VII grants privileges for the purpose of expediting travel.
100 This is the principle of "nationality discrimination," based on the theory that
the only reason for granting a local citizen immunity is for his actions in an official
capacity for the Organization. Preuss, "The International Organizations Immunities Act,"
40 AM. J. INT. L. 332 at 337 (1946).
110 UNEF Agreement, 1[12(a), p. 53.
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mander.111 If a matter does not relate to a member's official duties
so that civil jurisdiction may be exercised by the Egyptian courts,
"the Egyptian courts and authorities_ shall grant members of the
Force sufficient opportunity to safeguard their rights." 112 The
substance of the rights referred to must be determined by reference
to the requirements of customary international law. 113 The NATO
agreement is much more specific in this regard, listing several
specific rights114 designed to assure defendants, in part, what
Americans would describe as due process of law. At least some
of these rights would not be necessarily included in the protection
accorded by customary international law. If, on the other hand, a
matter does relate to a member's official duties the claim is handled
in the manner set out in the section on settlement procedures
(below).
Provision is also made for satisfaction of judgments.115 Property
of a member of the Force may be seized for "the satisfaction of
a judgment, decision or order" subject to two exceptions: (1)
property which is certified by the Commander to be needed by
him for the fulfillment of his official duties and (2) property
exempt under Egyptian law. The personal liberty of a member of
the Force cannot be restricted in a civil proceeding for any reason.
If "a claim adjudicated or an award made in favour of the claimant
by an Egyptian court or the Claims Commission ... has not been

111 UNEF Agreement, 1fl3, p. 54. Several Egyptian decisions in World War II refused
to give conclusive effect to official declarations or certificates of military commanders
concerning the question whether the criminal offender was at the time engaged in
service commande. Brinton, "Jurisdiction Over Members of Allied Forces in Egypt," 38
AM. J. INT. L. 375 at 382 (1944). Article 4 of the Treaty of London (1936) between Great
Britain and Egypt, U.K.T.S. iNo. 6, p. 24 (1937) applied the official duties test only to
cases of civil jurisdiction. Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Criminal
Jurisdiction," 27 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 186 at 194, 195 (1950). The determination of whether
a given act related to a member's official duties was reserved to the British Ambassador.
Brinton, "Jurisdiction Over Members of Allied Forces in Egypt," 38 AM. J. INT. L. 375 at
378 (1944).
112 UNEF Agreement, 1fl2(b), p. 53.
113 See BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 473, 474, 487-496 (1953).
114 NATO SOF, art. VII, 1f9 entitles members of visiting forces "(a) to a prompt and
speedy trial; Q>) to be informed, in advance, of the specific charge or charges made against
him; (c) to be confronted with the witnesses against -him; (d) to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favour . . . ; (e) to :have legal representation of his own
choice .•. under the conditions prevailing for the time being in the receiving State;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and (g) to
communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State and, when
the rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present at his trial."
115 UNEF Agreement, 1fl2(b), (c), pp. 53, 54. Paragraph 12(b) states that the exempted
categories shall be free from seizure.
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satisfied, the Egyptian authorities may, without prejudice to the
claimant's rights, seek the good offices of the Secretary General to
obtain satisfaction." 116 The only civil immunity accorded NATO
forces is from proceedings to enforce a judgment against a member in a matter arising from the performance of his official duties. 117
In addition, the Secretary General's Regulations provide that
"Members of the Force are entitled to the legal protection of the
United Nations and shall be regarded as agents" thereof for purposes of this protection.118 This suggests the advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice119 that the United Nations could
bring an international claim not only for damage to itself, but also
(with some dissent) for injuries to the particular agent of the UN,
on the theory that the agent should be assured of protection by
the organization, rather than be required to turn to his national
state to press an international claim for him. The policy consideration in favor of this conclusion is that it relieves an international
servant from dependence on his own state where an international
claim is to be allowed on his behalf.120
All members of UNEF are exempt from taxes121 on pay received from their national states or the UN and from all other
direct taxes except municipal rates for services enjoyed,122 and can
import free of duty all personal effects. Any personal property "not
required of them by reason of their presence in Egypt with the
Force" is subject to customs and exchange regulations,1 23 however.
(3) Settlement procedures. The agreement is fairly detailed in
this respect. The International Court of Justice, a special claims
commission and an arbitral tribunal are availed of for these
purposes.

51.

116 Id., ffl2(c), p.
117 NATO SOF, art. VIII, ffff9 and
118 UNEF Regulation 30.
119 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174.
120 Id. at 183, 184.
121 UNEF Agreement, ff26. Article

5(g), art. XI, ffl.

X of NATO SOF is similar in effect. Neither
agreement immunizes members from taxes on purchases of goods or services. See NATO
SOF, Art. IX, ff8.
122 Section 7(a) if the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
is to the same effect. The exception from immunity for taxes which are in fact a charge
for services is common.
123 NATO SOF, art. XI, ffff5, 6 and 7 accord NATO members the same privilege.
Imported articles subject to customs duties for failure to meet the requirements of
immunity are also subject to direct taxes under the last sentence of art. X, ffl, but
apparently not under the NATO provision which confers immunity from all direct taxes
except those which are charges for services enjoyed.
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(a) Claims commission. The Commission is composed of three
persons, the Secretary General and Egyptian Government each
appointing one, and a Chairman jointly. 124 The most important
function of the Claims Commission is to hear claims brought by
a citizen or the government of Egypt against a member of the
Force which relate to a matter in connection with his official duties.
The Claims Commission will also settle claims by Egypt or the
United Nations against each other unless the question involves
an interpretation of the status agreement, in which case the matter
is to be decided by an arbitral tribunal in accordance with paragraph 40. 125 The agreement simply states that such claims are to
be "settled" by the Commission, but does not specifically state
that its decision is final and binding.
(b) Arbitral tribunal. Paragraph 40 of the agreement provides
that disputes between the United Nations and Egypt concerning
the "interpretation or application" of the status agreement, and
not settled by negotiation "or other agreed mode of settlement"
are to be referred for final settlement to an arbitral tribunal126
which, like the Claims Commission, is to consist of three persons,
the Secretary General and Egypt to choose one apiece and an
umpire jointly. Provision is also made to assure that neither party
can block the arbitral process by refusing to participate or appoint
a representative such as occurred in connection with the alleged
violations of human rights under the Peace Treaties of 1947
respecting Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.127 If the parties cannot agree on an umpire within one month of the proposal for
arbitration by one of the parties, "the President of the International Court of Justice shall be asked by either party to appoint
the umpire." The tribunal will come into existence on appointment of the umpire and at least one other member of the tribunal
and two members constitute a quorum, a favorable vote by two
members being sufficient for all ·decisions thereof. Thus, it is im-

124 UNEF Agreement, 1[38, p. 56.
125 Id., 1[1[38 and 40, pp. 56, 57. Article

XVI of NATO SOF requires that all differences "relating to the interpretation or application" of that agreement be settled
"by negotiation ,between them without recourse to any outside jurisdiction."
126 The question whether a dispute concerns the "interpretation or application"
of the status agreement, and hence, whether" the Claims Commission or the Arbitral
Tribunal has jurisdiction should be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal since such a
question involves interpretation and application of the words "concerning the interpretation or application of these arrangements" in paragraph 40.
127 See BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAw 59-61 (1953).
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possible for one party to prevent arbitration by refusing to cooperate in setting up the commission.
(c) International Court of Justice. Should a dispute arise over
the interpretation of any of the provisions of the Convention on
Privileges and Immunities incorporated in the agreement, the
question is to be submitted to the International Court of Justice
for an advisory opinion which shall be accepted as binding.128
The UNEF status agreement is a response to a novel legal
development on the international scene. It has skillfully taken
account of the hybrid nature of the Force which is part military
and in part like other international observer groups and truce
supervision teams. The independence of the Force has been carefully guarded on the basis of a functional approach to the question
of privileges and immunities. Although the agreement reiterates
the proposition that UNEF is a "subsidiary organ of the United
Nations" the special privileges and immunities accorded that
organization and its personnel are not extended to the military
elements of the Force, which are treated with due regard to their
character as friendly foreign military personnel. The more favorable treatment accorded these UNEF military personnel as compared with current status-of-forces agreements such as those of
NATO and Japan can be explained by the greater urgency under
which UNEF entered Egypt, the comparatively greater emphasis
on the temporary character of its stay, and the international
character of this Force.
It should be noted, however, that the present arrangements
were concluded with only one party to the controversy, since Israel
has refused to admit the Force on its side of the armistice line. 129
Looking to the future, the very nature of a UNEF-type force makes
it most useful in situations where there is friction across an international boundary,130 so that its effective functioning might make
operations on the territory of more than one country desirable.
If the Force is deployed in more than one country it would obviously be desirable that its status be defined in a single agreement, or, if this proves impossible, that the substantive provisions
be identical. Nevertheless, depending on the type of receiving
countries and the circumstances there may well be a basis for some

128 UNEF Agreement, 1[39, p. 56. KEl.sEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS
129 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1[15 (1957).
130 Text at notes 11 to 14 supra.

486 {1950).
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variations in these provisions. The present arrangements with
Egypt furnish a valuable precedent and a model on which alternative agreements can be prepared in advance of future needs. This
kind of advance preparation, which would have to be flexible
enough to take into account the need for variation, could facilitate
the rapid deployment of a future UN force by removing doubts
as to its role and status on the part of both the contributing and
receiving states.

III. Other Problems Posed by the Force
A. Death and Injury Claims. The United Nations' liability for
claims resulting from death or injury to members of the Force
remains an open question. The Secretary General stated in his
report of October 1957 that thirteen members of the Force have
died or been killed,131 in addition to several injury cases; but no
claims had as yet been filed against the United Nations. Mr.
Hammarskjold's position is that such death or injury qualifies the
personnel or their dependents for benefits under their respective
national service schemes, which should administer these payments
and later file claims with the United Nations. He has requested
that such claims be limited to "cases of death or serious disability
involving a material cost to the Government." In view of the
uniqueness of the problem, the Secretary General has requested
a temporary period during which claims can be dealt with on the
merits of each case, so that formal rules need not be established
at this time. 132 Ideally, all of these losses should be borne by the
United Nations rather than the contributing states, as it is in the
service of that organization that they are incurred. Claims which
arise specifically from service in UNEF and do not meet the standard proposed by the Secretary General constitute an inequitable
burden on the contributing state.
B. Financial Problems. The most troublesome problem associated with UNEF is how it should be properly financed. 183 The
Soviet Union has insisted that the parties who brought on the
131 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1196 (1957). Causes of the fatalities are said to be mainly accidental shootings, encounters with mines and traffic accidents, id., 1122.
132 Id., 11\192 to 98.
133 Costs for the 14-month period ending December 31, 1957 were estimated at between
$24 million and $30.5 million. U.N. Doc. A/3694, \[99 (1957). This does not take account
of the considerable savings accruing to the UN due to facilities contributed by various
member states, id., \[\[58 to 62.
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crisis should bear the entire cost.134 In addition to the obvious
political objections to this kind of solution in the Suez controversy,
it would seriously impair the possibility of employing a UN force
by requiring a political judgment of the responsibility for the
crisis in each case.135 Setting aside the practical problems associated
with obtaining funds from the members of the UN,136 the policy
question presented is how much of the cost should be borne by
the United Nations as a whole, and how much by the states contributing units. It might seem that the UN should bear the entire
burden, but it should be recalled that these forces constitute part
of the respective national military establishments which may be
withdrawn by these governments. If the UN were to pay all costs
it would be in part reimbursing these states for pay and similar
expenses which they would have incurred in any event. The first
formula recommended and used by the Secretary General therefore called for the contributing states to pay all costs of equipment
and salaries, and for the United Nations to assume all other expenses.137 This formula did not, however, take account of the extra
costs incurred by the contributing states in maintaining their units
overseas, and the General Assembly therefore approved138 the
Secretary General's proposal139 to reimburse these states "for all
extra and extraordinary costs" incurred in making its forces available to UNEF beyond the first six months. 140 These extra costs
include any extra pay or allowances paid by reason of service with
UNEF and for abnormal depreciation and destruction of equipment.141 The Force is being financed outside the normal budget
of the United Nations.142 An initial sum was provided by the

134 Report of the Fifth Committee, U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. R.Ec., 11th Sess.
Annexes, Agenda Item 66, p. 65, lf25 (Doc. No. A/3560 Add. I) (1957).
135 Moreover, such a policy would confront the parties to a dispute, whose cooperation is of primary importance, with the prospect of an economic penalty as the result
of agreeing to the use of a force.
136 See Report of Mr. Carnahan from the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Relative
to the Establishment of a United Nations Force, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
International Organizations and Movements of the Committee for Foreign Affairs on
H. Res. 367 and H. Con. Res. 373, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 99 (1958).
137 U.N. Doc. A/3694, lf80 (1957).
138 Res. 1151 (XII) U.N. Doc. AjRes/1151 (XII) (Nov. 1957).
139 U.N. Doc. A/3694, lf88 (1957).
140 The reason for the six-month dividing line is that the additional costs incurred
beyond that point exceed what a contributing state could foresee or be fairly expected
to bear. Id., lf85.
141 Id., lf91.
142 Id., lf48.
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establishment of a special account in the amount of $10 million
which was financed by special assessments according to the scale
of assessments used in connection with the normal budget. 143
Costs in excess of that amount have been left to voluntary contributions by members.144 In response to the Secretary General's
October report, the General Assembly appropriated additional
funds for operations in 1957-1958 and several additional voluntary
contributions were received. 145 Nevertheless, the reluctance of
the membership as a whole to bear the costs of UNEF is one of
the more sobering considerations associated with planning for
a permanent force. 146

IV. Conclusion
The fact that the General Assembly cannot impose a binding
obligation on any state to accept a UN force makes its effectiveness largely dependent on the consent of the receiving state. The
present status agreement with Egypt accords the UNEF more rights
than it could demand under customary international law and yet
adequately protects the interests of Egypt. On the whole, these arrangements have worked satisfactorily, except that the Force
should be given greater discretion with regard to its deployment
and authority to take action against individual violators of the
truce which it is policing.
It would appear that the establishment, as opposed to stationing and operation, of a UN force in a country does not require
the advance consent of any particular member. UNEF has provided a precedent on which the framework and legal status of a
permanent force can be constructed. The advance organization of
a force could greatly enhance its usefulness both to the General
Assembly which may recommend its employment, and to the
143 Id.,
144 Id.,

IT\T50, 51.
ITIT52, 53. Voluntary contributions were meager until several came in during
November in response to the plea of the Secretary General, ibid., and U.N. Docs. A/3745,
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REc., 12th Sess., Agenda No. 65 (1957), A/3694/Add. 1 (Nov.
1957).
145 Ibid.
146 Twenty percent of the contributions assessed to supply the first $10 million have
not been paid because the members involved have refused. U.N. Doc. A/3694, \T66 (1957).
Only a little more than half of this assessment had been paid when the Secretary General
issued his report in October 1957 (id., \T99). Sanction against members who refuse to pay
is found in article 19 of the Charter which provides that if a member is in arrears in
payment of its financial contributions to the Organization in an amount equal to or
exceeding the amount of contributions due from that member for the preceding two full
years, that member shall have no vote in the General Assembly.
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Security Council, which may call upon the parties to a dispute to
admit the force as a "provisional measure" under Article 40, 147
or as a measure not involving the use of armed force under Article
39148 of the United Nations Charter.
Dudley H. Chapman, S.Ed.

147 It is probable that the Security Council cannot impose a legal obligation by calling
upon the parties to a dispute to comply with provisional measures under this article, but
the failure to comply may justify use of sanctions under article 42. The obligation is
considered stronger than any the General Assembly is capable of imposing. GooDRICH AND
HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 274, 275 (1949).
148See note 14 supra.

